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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the tensions, problems and challenges associated with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality. In particular, it examines the basic objections against 
this conception of citizenship raised by both traditional and contemporary criticism, each claiming that this concept 
of citizenship is either too permissive and inefficient on the one hand or too divisive, unfairly discriminatory and 
oppressive on the other. The paper then delineates the requirement of difference-sensitivity that is consistent with the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic equality.
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LA CITTADINANZA E L’UGUAGLIANZA CIVICA: TENSIONI, PROBLEMI E SFIDE
SINTESI
L’articolo si propone di esaminare le tensioni, i problemi e le sfide associate con la versione liberale del concetto 
di cittadinanza basato su diritti e il suo impegno per l’uguaglianza civica. In particolare esamina le obiezioni fonda-
mentali contro la tale concezione di cittadinanza sollevate sia dalla critica tradizionale sia quella contemporanea, le 
quali sostengono che questo concetto di cittadinanza sia, da una parte, troppo permissivo ed inefficiente o, dall’altra, 
troppo divisivo, ingiustamente discriminatorio ed oppressivo. In seguito, l’articolo mette in evidenza la necessità 
della sensibilità alle differenze consistente con la versione liberale della concezione di cittadinanza basata su diritti 
e il suo impegno per l’uguaglianza civica.
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RIGHTS-BASED 
CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship as a political conception of the person is 
both complex and controversial, as holding the status of 
citizenship includes a number of distinct and interrelat-
ed meanings, i.e. sharing a common legal status of civic 
equality, enjoying the benefits of a formally defined set 
of basic rights and fundamental liberties and assuming 
the responsibilities which give effect to the experience 
of shared membership in a political community. In this 
sense, citizenship consists of two fundamental dimen-
sions, i.e. [i] the vertical dimension; and [ii] the horizon-
tal dimension. The first dimension refers to citizenship 
as a status which determines the relationship between a 
member of a polity and the political community. Citizen-
ship, Kymlicka emphasizes, “refers to membership in a 
political community, and hence designates a relationship 
between the individual and the state” (Kymlicka, 2003a, 
147). On this understanding, writes Rawls, the role of the 
citizen is “specified by its political institutions” (Rawls, 
1999, 460). The second dimension of citizenship as a 
political conception of the person is primarily horizontal 
and expresses the social, cultural and psychological re-
lations between a political community and its members 
as well as the relationship between members of a polity 
themselves and their relationship towards those who are 
not members of their political community. The two di-
mensions of citizenship as membership in a polity refer 
to the three basic elements any conception of citizenship 
is bound to entail, i.e. [i] the status-based element; [ii] the 
rights-based element; and [iii] the virtue-based element. I 
turn to these elements in the next part of this paper. 
The status-based element of citizenship
The status-based element of citizenship raises the 
question of membership, i.e. who is a citizen of a pol-
ity and what are the qualifications for membership in a 
political community. As a status, citizenship is conferred 
upon individuals via a threefold mechanism. The first is 
by aggregation, i.e. by being born within the territory of 
a state [jus soli], the second by birth, i.e. obtaining the 
status of citizenship by descent or parentage [jus san-
guinis]. These two mechanisms show that the acquisi-
tion of citizenship as membership in a political commu-
nity is first and foremost beyond of the volitional power 
of the individual. As Rawls rightly emphasizes, we do 
not join society “voluntarily but are born into it” (Rawls, 
1999, 397). As citizens, he argues, “we find ourselves in 
a particular political society at a certain moment of his-
torical time” (Rawls, 2001, 4). In this respect, the status 
of citizenship is primarily an involuntary personal char-
acteristic. The acquisition of citizenship via this twofold 
mechanism needs to be contrasted with a volitional 
mechanism available to those who want to acquire the 
status of citizenship of a particular political community. 
The conferring of citizenship is through an act of con-
science-based volition [volitional allegiance] and the re-
lated process of naturalization. In fact, Samuel Scheffler 
explains, “actual liberal societies attach far more weight 
to birth than to choice in assigning citizenship and its 
associated privileges and obligations” (Scheffler, 2002, 
70; Shachar, 2009). Throughout history, the question 
of membership is associated with the status-based ele-
ment of citizenship of who is a member of a polity and 
what the qualifications are for holding the status of citi-
zenship, such as sex, race, ethnicity, religion, property, 
military service. Also, what the bases are for granting 
individuals the status of citizenship remains the crucial 
aspect that define the nature of citizenship as member-
ship in a polity as well as the very character of a political 
community. As J.G.A Pocock pointed out in his seminal 
article ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’, 
“For Aristotle […] the citizen must be a male of known 
genealogy, a patriarch, a warrior, and the master of the 
labor of others (normally slaves […]” (Pocock, 1995, 
31). In other words, the status of citizenship in ancient 
Athens was defined by a number of qualifications that 
any contemporary conception of citizenship would find 
exclusive, discriminatory and oppressive. 
The rights-based element of citizenship
The question of the basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms that are associated with the rights-based ele-
ment of citizenship identified above need to be divided 
further into two distinct questions, i.e. [a] why members 
of a polity have rights; and [b] what rights are to be as-
sociated with the status of citizenship, e.g. civil, politi-
cal, social, cultural rights. From a liberal interpretation 
of the first question, two basic functions associated with 
the question of why members of a political community 
have rights arise, i.e. (a) the traditional aspect; and (b) 
the modern aspect. 
The first question refers to the basic interests rights 
as entitlements granted to members of a political com-
munity. The traditional aspect of rights is associated with 
the protective function they primarily perform. From this 
point of view, rights protect individuals against the risk 
of the “tyranny of the majority”. In other words, these 
are rights that members of a polity are entitled to by 
virtue of their membership in a political community to 
limit the power of the state as well as the scope of ma-
jority decision-making power. This characterisation of 
the relationship between the individual and the political 
community upon which the rights-based conception of 
citizenship is articulated assumes that the basic function 
of rights and the basic institutional framework of a polity 
is to protect the individual liberties of its members, not 
to make its citizens virtuous or to impose upon them any 
particular concept of good. 
On the other hand, the modern aspect of the ques-
tion why members of a polity have rights is based on 
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the integrative function of rights, which are to produce a 
sense of civic unity and social cohesion among members 
of a political community (Štrajn, 2008). As T.H. Marshall 
firmly points out, equal rights of citizenship would gen-
erate a “direct sense of community membership based 
on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common posses-
sion” (Marshall, 1992, 40). In this respect, the integra-
tive function which rights perform is primarily aimed at 
the development of a sense of mutual connectedness 
and unity among members of a political community 
who differ amongst themselves in terms of race, ethnic-
ity, religion etc. However, we need to contrast the two 
questions here. On the one hand, the first question of 
the rights-based element of citizenship identifies the dif-
ferent functions which rights perform for those who hold 
the status of membership in a polity, such as the protec-
tive function and the integrative function. On the other 
hand, the second question of what rights define the status 
of citizenship raises a different set of challenges as each 
of the major theoretical positions outline a different set 
of entitlements members of a polity should be granted. 
In this respect, conceptions of citizenship differ among 
themselves in three separate respects, i.e. [i] what rights 
should members of a polity have; [ii] what are the priori-
ties between the rights granted to members of a polity; 
and [iii] what interests should rights as entitlements pro-
tect? This leads to a number of different understandings 
of the nature of citizenship and the nature of the political 
community itself. For example, the liberal and multicul-
turalist conception of citizenship are primarily divided 
over the issue whether cultural rights should be granted 
to members of ethnocultural minorities.
The virtue-based element of citizenship
Citizenship as a shared political status gives us ac-
cess to institutions, deliberative arenas and opportuni-
ties while at the same time requires us to act in these 
spheres in accordance with a common set of political 
values, principles and standards of public reason. In 
other words, citizens as free and equal membership in a 
polity appear to be giving way to citizens seen as indi-
viduals living in society with other members of their po-
litical community, in a variety of situations, conditions 
and circumstances. The virtue-based element of the lib-
eral version of the rights-based conception of citizen-
ship opens the question of the obligations the status of 
citizenship poses on those holding this status as the ide-
al of civic equality also make demands on how citizens 
behave within the internal and private arrangements of 
the associative network of civil society. Among the most 
widely acclaimed achievements bearing this mark is the 
expansion of non-discrimination from the public sphere 
into the sphere of civil society. The demand for civility 
in the sphere of civil society has been one of the effects 
of the public sphere and its institutional framework, for 
example the desegregation of US society in the 1960s 
and 70s. However, feminist scholars argue, civil soci-
ety can have a negative effect on citizenship in public. 
Women and other at-risk members of minority groups 
can have difficulties in exercising their individual rights 
and fundamental freedoms due to the possible con-
straints placed upon them by their membership in the 
associative network of civil society, through discrimi-
nation, oppression and exploitation [reverse spillover]. 
This extension of common principles and shared public 
values into the sphere of civil society has both positive 
and negative effects (Rosenblum, 2000). On the posi-
tive side, the extension of the public principle of non-
discrimination into the other social spheres does pri-
marily perform a positive function, such as through the 
spread of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, race 
and religious belief into other social spheres like educa-
tion, employment. On the negative side, the extension 
of shared public values and the congruence of values 
between the two spheres might involve an [unjust] im-
position of civic obligations and responsibilities of the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizen-
ship upon the associational network of civil society as 
values and the very structure of an association might be 
illiberal, undemocratic or both. The liberal conception 
of citizenship therefore makes demands regarding how 
citizens behave within civil society. As Will Kymlicka 
emphasized, the translation of the public principle of 
non-discrimination from government to civil society in-
volves a “radical extension in the obligations of liberal 
citizenship” (Kymlicka, 2003b, 50). As Jeff Spinner-Ha-
lev claims,
[t]he universal nature of citizenship may triumph 
over, or at least transform, private identities. Liberal-
ism makes far-reaching demands on how ordinary 
citizens act toward each other in many different set-
tings. (Spinner-Halev, 1994, 37–38)
This transformative effect of liberal citizenship can 
have the twofold effect of a gravitational pull towards 
the mainstream with the melting away of the distinc-
tive features of a cultural group [the liberal expectancy 
effect] and the creation of conflicting diversity and the 
subsequent distance of the marginalised social group 
from the mainstream [the conflicting diversity effect]. 
This characterization of the circumstances of the rights-
based conception of citizenship also delineates the 
status and the function of civil society in a liberal and 
democratic polity. 
To summarise: the evolution of the ideal of civic 
equality which defines the liberal version of the rights-
based conception of citizenship is defined by two char-
acteristic features. Historically, the first characteristic 
feature consisted in the inclusion of those individuals 
that figure as equal members of a polity and has gradu-
ally resulted in the inclusion of those individuals and 
social groups who were previously excluded from the 
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status of citizenship. Compared to ancient Athens or the 
medieval city states, contemporary liberal and demo-
cratic societies are much more inclusive. The second 
characteristic feature of the ideal of civic equality as-
sociated with the rights-based conception of citizenship 
refers to the extension of rights that anyone holding the 
status of citizenship is entitled to. According to the his-
torical interpretation of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship examined in Marshall’s essay Citizenship 
and Social Class (1992), the rights and liberties granted 
to members of a polity were gradually expanded to in-
corporate three sets of rights that are traditionally associ-
ated with the liberal version of the rights-based concep-
tion of citizenship, i.e. civil rights [in the 18th century]; 
political rights [in the 19th century]; and social rights [in 
the 20th century] (Marshall, 1992). In this interpretation, 
over the last three centuries, the evolution of the sta-
tus of citizenship as a political conception of the person 
has therefore witnessed a twofold expansion. The first 
consisted in the expansion of those who figure as civic 
equals in a particular political community [expansion 
of membership] whereas the second expansion consist-
ed of the expansion of different groups of rights which 
members of a polity are entitled to [expansion of entitle-
ment]. This twofold expansion associated with free and 
equal membership in a polity includes an equal distribu-
tion of a share of political power and protection from the 
abuse of this power granted by “a fully adequate scheme 
of equal basic liberties” (Rawls, 2001, 42).
However, the liberal version of the rights-based con-
ception of citizenship and its principled commitment to 
civic equality could not altogether sidestep some of the 
challenges associated with diversity nor did it eventu-
ate in full social justice for all members of a polity. In 
fact, both the expansion of membership and the expan-
sion of entitlement which characterise the development 
of the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship and its commitment to civic equality raise 
a number of separate objections that are advanced by 
both the traditional and the contemporary criticism of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship. They will be 
examined in a more detailed manner in the next section 
of this paper.
CRITIQUE OF THE RIGHTS-BASED CONCEPTION 
OF CITIZENSHIP
The liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship and its normative commitment to civic 
equality examined in the preceding section of this pa-
per has been criticized from two distinct and opposing 
directions, i.e. [i] the traditional criticism; and [ii] the 
contemporary criticism. Both critics forcefully argue that 
this conception of citizenship is either too permissive 
and inefficient or too divisive, unfairly discriminatory 
and oppressive. The traditional criticism of the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship and 
its normative commitment to civic equality incorporates 
four divergent critiques, each targeting a particular ele-
ment associated with this model of citizenship: the civic 
republican critique (e.g. Beiner, 2003; Miller, 2000); the 
communitarian critique (e.g. Sandel, 1982; MacIntyre, 
1983; Taylor, 1989; Walzer, 1983); the libertarian cri-
tique (e.g. Nozick, 1974); and the social conservative 
critique (e.g. Scruton, 2002). The contemporary criti-
cism of the rights-based conception of citizenship and 
its normative commitment to civic equality incorpo-
rates three distinct critiques: the deliberative democrat-
ic critique (e.g. Brettschneider, 2006; Deveaux, 2009; 
Talisse, 2005); the feminist critique (e.g. Okin, 1989; 
Nussbaum, 1999; Shachar, 2001; Song, 2007); and the 
multiculturalist critique (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995; Modood; 
2007; Parekh, 2000; Raz, 1994; Young, 1990). Further 
on I examine the main objections advanced by the tradi-
tional criticism of the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship and then proceed in a more 
detailed manner with the exposition of the two versions 
of the multiculturalist critique and its twofold objection 
against the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship and its normative commitment to civic 
equality.
The traditional criticism of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship
The traditional criticism identified above is com-
posed of three separate objections, each targeting a par-
ticular element of the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship identified in Section II of this 
paper as well as the two characteristic features of the 
principled commitment to civic equality in general, i.e. 
[i] the identity-related objection [associated with the 
expansion of membership]; [ii] the virtue-related objec-
tion; and [iii] the effectiveness-related objection [both 
associated with the expansion of entitlement].
The first objection [the identity-related objection] 
has posed two different challenges to the promotion of 
citizenship as a shared civic identity (Šimenc, 2011). 
On the one hand, the expansion of the number of those 
granted the status of citizenship resulted in the decreas-
ing of civic unity and social cohesion as by creating a 
more inclusive community where membership in a pol-
ity is not predisposed to nor limited by ethnicity, race, 
language, religion, income or cultural membership, the 
sense of civic unity and social cohesion among members 
can be diluted (Kodelja, 2011; Prebilič, Barle, 2011). 
On the other hand, if more and more individuals are 
granted full political membership in a polity, those who 
remain excluded are much more radically marginalised. 
An inclusive polity can therefore be more polarised and 
composed disproportionately of a large inclusive minor-
ity that may have difficulties in coping with the diversity 
and the subsequent lack of civic unity and social cohe-
sion as well as a small part of those who are much more 
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radically marginalized from society’s broader social ar-
rangements and its basic institutional framework.
The second objection advanced by the traditional 
criticism is largely formulated against the consequences 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship, i.e. the in-
dividuals’ basic rights and fundamental freedoms [the 
virtue-based objection]. According to this criticism, the 
liberal version of the rights-based conception of citizen-
ship pays little or no attention at all to the importance 
of community and shared membership. One of the most 
persistent criticisms of liberalism and its conception of 
citizenship, writes Samuel Scheffler, “is that the priority it 
assigns to freedom and individual rights is not simply dis-
ruptive of conventional social norms but also undermines 
the value of community” (Scheffler, 2002, 18). In particu-
lar, the civic-republican and the communitarian critique 
blame the liberal version of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship for all major problems contemporary plu-
rally diverse societies are faced with, such as the low 
turn-out at local, regional or national elections; the dis-
engagement of individuals from the associative network 
of civil society; the decrease in social capital expressed 
through low trust in the basic institutional framework of 
a plurally diverse polity, and the overall disengagement 
of citizens from active participation in shared public life. 
According to these criticisms, as Samuel Scheffler points 
out, the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship bears the responsibility for 
a host of social problems, whose source, according to 
many critics, lies ultimately in a culture of individual-
ism and a breakdown of communal values for which 
liberal thought itself is responsible. (Scheffler, 1994, 5)
In this sense, the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship has been criticised as being 
too disruptive as well as not demanding enough be-
cause it lacks the necessary means to support the sense 
of unity among members of a political community. It 
argues that the presence of different and competing 
values, beliefs and practices fails to take into account 
the degree of moral convergence it takes to sustain a 
plurally diverse polity and therefore contributes to the 
fragmentation and falling off of unity among citizens. 
In particular, civic republicans criticise primarily civil 
rights including freedom of expression and freedom of 
association as they allegedly undermine the primacy of 
political rights, such as political participation and com-
munity involvement.
The third objection against the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship [the effective-
ness-related objection] advanced by social conserva-
tives (Scruton, 2002) and libertarians (Friedman, 2002; 
Nozick, 1974) targets welfare elements of the rights-
based element of citizenship such as social rights. Two 
different criticisms need to be distinguished here, i.e. [i] 
the efficiency-related criticism; and [ii] the oppression-
related criticism. On the one hand, according to the effi-
ciency-related criticism, the positive entitlements guar-
anteed by the state and its basic institutional framework, 
such as the right to health care, unemployment support 
and public education, undermine individual responsi-
bility for the choices individuals make. On the other 
hand, according to the oppression-related criticism, so-
cial rights seriously undermine other fundamental rights 
of other members of a political community, for exam-
ple property rights. In this sense, redistribution is largely 
seen as jeopardizing individual liberty. 
I turn now to a presentation of the contemporary 
criticism of the liberal version of the rights-based con-
ception of citizenship, whose various critiques and ob-
jections challenge the consistency of this conception of 
citizenship with its basic foundations and the core nor-
mative principles associated with citizenship as free and 
equal membership in a polity. 
The contemporary criticism of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship
Contrary to the objections raised by the traditional 
criticism of the liberal version of the rights-based con-
ception of citizenship that it undermines the overall 
stability of a plurally diverse polity and the mainte-
nance of its basic institutional framework, the objec-
tions advanced by modern criticism, question its con-
sistency with the basic principles of citizenship as free 
and equal membership in a political community. As has 
been emphasized at the outset of section III of this pa-
per, contemporary criticism of the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship and its normative 
commitment to civic equality consists of three distinct 
critiques including the deliberative democratic critique; 
the feminist critique; and the multiculturalist critique. 
The deliberative democratic critique of the limita-
tions and shortcomings of conflict resolution using the 
liberal formula (e.g. Brettschneider, 2006; Deveaux, 
2009; Talisse, 2005), which weigh different claims in 
terms of different rights advances the objection that 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship cannot solve the conflicts between equally 
compelling claims, such as gender justice and cultural 
coherence. As Monique Deveaux emphasized, “liberal 
principles set limits to both the form and possible out-
comes to such deliberations” (Deveaux, 2009, 24).
In contrast, the feminist critique of the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship has criti-
cized liberalism’s alleged indifference to various forms 
of injustice in the private sphere and the perpetuation of 
inequality between the sexes in the public sphere and its 
basic institutional framework (Okin, 1989, 1994). In this 
sense, the very ideal of citizenship as a free and equal 
membership in a political community is incompatible 
with the principle of non-discrimination and its commit-
ment to gender equality. 
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On the other hand, the multiculturalist critique claims 
that the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship is insensitive to the various claims for the ac-
commodation of diversity in the institutional framework 
of a plurally diverse polity and has not redeemed its 
normative commitment to both civic equality and equal 
civic respect for diversity. Even with winning full citizen-
ship status, inclusive of equality of status and equal civil, 
political and social rights, various groups and individuals 
remain either excluded or marginalised (Lukšič-Hacin, 
2004). In this interpretation, the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship remains contested 
since its twofold expansion of membership and the ex-
pansion of entitlement have not resulted in an inclusive, 
just and stable polity. Members of minority cultures, so 
the criticism goes, continue to suffer unfair disadvantag-
es compared to those who are part of the mainstream 
since they does not enjoy the same choice-enabling 
background conditions as do members of mainstream 
cultures/religions despite the equal basic rights granted 
to all members of a polity. What is therefore required, 
advocates of multiculturalism in general argue is not just 
equal protection of basic rights, e.g. freedom of associa-
tion [associative liberty] and freedom of expression [ex-
pressive liberty], and toleration of diversity, but the grant-
ing of group-specific rights and the recognition of their 
diversity that would compensate and reduce the asym-
metry between the majority and the minority groups. 
The multiculturalist critique of the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship is both com-
plex and manifold at the same time. We can distinguish 
between two different views associated with the multi-
culturalist critique which need to be distinguished here, 
i.e. [i] the moderate multiculturalist view (Kymlicka, 
1995; Raz, 1994); and [ii] the critical multicultural-
ist view (Modood, 2007; Parekh, 2000; Young, 1990). 
I examine each of these two views identified here be-
low, together with an examination of the two models of 
citizenship advanced by the multiculturalist critique: the 
multicultural citizenship model; and the differentiated 
citizenship model.
The moderate multiculturalist view
The moderate multiculturalist view primarily claims 
that basic rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
the rights to freedom of religion, expression, thought, as-
sociation and political participation, are a necessary but 
not a sufficient mechanism to match with the obligations 
of equal civic respect for all citizens in the design of 
the institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity, 
including public education. This critique of the liberal 
version of the rights-based conception of citizenship is 
best exemplified by two competing claims which char-
acterize its advocates, i.e. [i] the requirement of equal 
choice; and [ii] the requirement of equal freedom [equal 
protection of cultural membership]. 
The first claim advanced by the moderate multicul-
turalist view, i.e. the requirement of equal choice main-
tains that individuals should have access to the cultures 
they are traditionally connected to (Kymlicka, 1995, 
2001). Those groups that are traditionally not part of the 
ethnocultural mainstream, should be given additional 
rights in order for their individuals to have the same 
choice-enabling conditions as do individual members 
of the ethnocultural majority. Contrary to the liberal ver-
sion of the rights-based conception of citizenship that 
distributes an equal set of rights to all members of a 
political community, the model of multicultural citizen-
ship distributes an additional set of rights on the basis 
of membership in groups which meet the criteria for ac-
commodation. 
The second claim advanced by the moderate multi-
culturalist view is that the requirement of equal freedom 
limits the effect of the first requirement on individual 
agency. In this sense, the additional rights given to mi-
nority cultures should not override the civil and political 
rights of its members (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). This sec-
ond requirement basically refuses to allow basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms to be overridden by the inter-
ests of subgroups in the maintenance of membership in 
their groups and the distinctive ethical environment of 
these groups. Advocates of the moderate multiculturalist 
view argue that internal restrictions over group members 
are inconsistent with liberalism’s basic premise of free 
and equal citizenship since they are likely to override 
individual rights and freedoms and may create the “re-
verse spillover” of these values into the public sphere. 
In this sense, cultural rights perform a twofold func-
tion. First, they are designed to ensure the protection 
of minority groups from the pressures and influences of 
the dominant society and from outside interference in 
general [the protection of cultural coherence]. Accom-
modation and recognition of diversity and granting of 
group-specific rights or policies which rely on external 
protection of a particular minority group do not over-
ride the individuals’ civil and political rights and are 
therefore consistent with the basic principles of free and 
equal citizenship. Second, part of the demand for a sup-
plementary set of minority group rights has been argued 
under the self-respect argument. Self-respect, writes 
Rawls in A Theory of Justice, “includes a person’s sense 
of his own value, his secure conviction that his concep-
tion of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out” 
(Rawls, 1999, 386). 
However, two challenges related to the model of 
multicultural citizenship arise here. First, external pro-
tections fail to comply with the normative commitment 
of civic equality in two important respects. On the one 
hand, they fail to meet the test of internal fairness within 
groups. On the other hand, they also fail to meet the 
test of pluralism. While group-specific rights assure the 
diversity between groups within a particular society, 
they potentially undermine the pluralism within groups 
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and therefore undermine the diversity within a society 
as well as within groups. The moderate multicultural-
ist view unfairly disadvantages members of a particular 
minority group that – in one respect or another – does 
not identify fully with a particular element or marker of 
group identity, like language, custom, religion or politi-
cal affiliation. Despite its promotion of between-group 
diversity within a society, the model of multicultural citi-
zenship advanced by the moderate multiculturalist view 
puts at risk the internal pluralism within groups. Second, 
the most troubling premise of the moderate multicultur-
alist view and the model of multicultural citizenship de-
mand is to treat individuals as a means to the well-being 
of a group or community, which is contrary to the basic 
normative commitment of civic equality. 
The critical multiculturalist view
The critical multiculturalist view (Modood, 2007; 
Parekh, 2000; Young, 1990) is much more radical in its 
critique of the liberal version of the rights-based concep-
tion of citizenship and the overall effects of the liberal 
institutional framework. It forcefully argues that this con-
ception of citizenship as free and equal membership in 
a polity and its commitment to civic equality is inegali-
tarian as well as oppressive and unfairly discriminatory. 
Two criticisms advanced by the advocates of the critical 
multiculturalist view need to be distinguished here.
The first criticism advances the claim that public insti-
tutions [including public schooling] are not neutral. As Iris 
Young emphasises, ‘rights and rules that are universally 
formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, 
gender, age, or disability, perpetuate rather than under-
mine oppression’ (Young, 1995, 267). In her critique of 
the liberal-egalitarian and the civic republican conception 
of citizenship and civic equality, she observes that both 
conceptions of citizenship do not pay adequate attention 
to the interests of those groups and communities she iden-
tifies as oppressed or marginalised. She argues that these 
two conceptions of citizenship and civic equality 
excludes women and other groups defined as differ-
ent, because its rational and universal status derives 
only from its opposition to affectivity, particularity and 
the body. Republican theorists insisted on the unity 
of the civic public: insofar as he is a citizen every 
man leaves behind his particularity and difference, to 
adopt a universal standpoint identical for all citizens, 
the standpoint of the common good or general will. In 
practice republican politicians enforced homogeneity 
by excluding from citizenship all those defined as dif-
ferent and associated with the body, desire or need 
influences that might veer citizenship away from the 
standpoint of pure reason. (Young, 1990, 117)
The second, and related criticism claims that even 
with the extension of the status of citizenship to those 
groups and individuals that are not part of society’s 
broader social arrangements very often remain at the 
margins of society. As Yael Tamir emphasises,
[m]embers of disempowered minorities soon discov-
ered that being granted a set of formal civic rights was 
insufficient to ensure equal status, and realised that 
they had to decide which was the lesser of two evils: 
remaining estranged and marginalised, or integrating 
at the price of self-effacement. Members of such mi-
norities thus became increasingly aware that the ideal 
of a culturally neutral public sphere embodies a dan-
gerous and oppressive illusion. (Tamir, 1995, 164)
According to this critique, both the liberal and the 
civic republican versions of the rights-based concep-
tion of citizenship offer an inadequate response to the 
problems of contemporary ‘circumstances of multicul-
turalism’ since they are insufficiently inclusive or even 
discriminatory. In particular, they does not give equal 
weight to the different conceptions of the good that are 
present in a plurally diverse polity.
In contrast, a politics of difference as advanced by Iris 
Marion Young (1990) requires the cultivation of a shared 
public space where the basic institutional framework of a 
polity is sensitive to the various differences amongst indi-
viduals and groups. Contrary to the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship and its basic com-
mitment to civic equality, as Avigail Eisenberg emphasis-
es, a politics of difference ‘recognises that social structures 
and institutions can only address oppression and domina-
tion by making space for difference and by not reducing 
difference to some impartial, neutral or universal perspec-
tive’ (Eisenberg, 2006, 15). However, I maintain, a more 
inclusive conception of citizenship that recognises the 
claims of pluralism and diversity faces a twofold chal-
lenge. First, accommodating group diversity might create 
or increase intra-group inequality within different com-
munities. Second, it might also create the risk of social 
fragmentation between various groups and individuals 
and therefore undermine both solidarity and social cohe-
sion of the polity itself. The model of differentiated citi-
zenship as elaborated by the critical multiculturalist view 
therefore brings problems and challenges of its own.
As we have seen in sections The moderate multi-
culturalist view and The critical multiculturalist view 
of this paper, the moderate multiculturalist view and 
the critical multiculturalist view have advanced a two-
fold objection to the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic 
equality. In a moderate view, the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship is incompatible 
with some forms of identity and personal values and 
does not pay equal respect to the members of ethno-
cultural minorities and their culture [equal civic respect 
objection]. It advances the claim that the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship basically 
reduces individuals’ ethnocultural membership to indi-
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vidual preferences and private choices. The moderate 
multiculturalist view acknowledges the priority granted 
to individual rights but it points out that this model of 
the protection of individual interest is insufficient. In 
this interpretation, the uniform treatment approach as-
sociated with an equal distribution of individual rights 
is insufficient for the preservation of a particular cul-
tural environment as a context of choice for individu-
als who belong to a particular non-dominant minority 
community. The critical multicultural view, in contrast, 
rejects outright the liberal conception of civic equality 
as inegalitarian in principle and both discriminatory and 
oppressive in effect. It maintains that the liberal version 
of the rights-based conception of citizenship actually 
reflects the norms, values and practices of the major-
ity and is subsequently prejudiced against those groups 
and individuals who are not part of society’s broader so-
cial arrangements [cultural subordination objection]. In 
particular, the critical multicultural view argues that the 
basic institutional framework of a plurally diverse polity 
is unable to develop a coherent response to cultural and 
value diversity. In this sense, the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship and its commit-
ment to civic equality offers an inadequate response to 
the problems of contemporary ‘circumstances of multi-
culturalism’ since it does not give equal weight to the 
different conceptions of the good present in a pluralist 
democratic society and is insufficiently inclusive in con-
fronting claims for the public acceptance and accom-
modation of diversity. In fact, as Sune Laegaard points 
out “liberalism is incomplete at best, or in itself unjust, 
at worst” (Laegaard, 2005, 326).
However, the basic question both versions of mul-
ticultural citizenship have to answer is whether their 
group-differentiated model of citizenship is consistent 
with the basic principled commitment to civic equality. I 
examine this challenge and the associated problems be-
low. While both models of multicultural citizenship aim 
to provide a justice-based account of a group-specific 
model of cultural rights they both fail to capture the plu-
ralism of diversity itself. In this respect, I argue, multicul-
turalism has itself become another part of the problem.
THE LIMITS OF THE MULTICULTURALIST CRITIQUE
Multiculturalism has been rejected by various schol-
ars as being an unsustainable policy of accommodat-
ing diversity; some of whom have been sympathetic and 
others critical of the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship that has been the motivational 
foundation for the development of the group-differenti-
ated models of citizenship advanced by the two views 
of multiculturalism presented in the previous section of 
this paper. Two groups of critics in particular need to 
be distinguished here, i.e. [i] the liberal egalitarian cri-
tique; and [ii] the feminist critique. Let me expand on 
both critiques and the main objections they raise against 
the limits of the multicultural citizenship model and the 
model of differentiated citizenship. 
The liberal egalitarian critique
In general, the liberal egalitarian critique exempli-
fied most clearly by Brian Barry in Culture and Equality 
(2001) advances a range of different objections against 
multiculturalism and its group-differentiated models of 
citizenship. Its primary target was to challenge the eman-
cipatory project of multiculturalism as incoherent at best 
or discriminatory and oppressive at worst. The justifica-
tion for its wholesale rejection has been largely based 
on the inconsistency of cultural rights with the princi-
pled commitment to civic equality. Two objections need 
to be distinguished here. The first is the justice-based 
objection, which argues that a differentiated distribution 
of entitlements as in the case of ethnocultural rights is 
inconsistent with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic 
equality. In this interpretation ethnocultural rights im-
pose a discriminatory understanding of the rights-based 
element of citizenship as a free and equal membership 
in a polity. The second is the equal respect objection, 
which argues that multicultural policies and the differ-
entiated treatment of non-dominant minority groups fail 
to meet the requirement of equal respect and concern 
between citizens of a plurally diverse polity. Barry’s con-
tentious objection is even more radical as he advances 
the assertion that the claims advanced by advocates of 
multiculturalism cannot be defended on justice-based 
premises. 
On this interpretation, the moderate multicultural-
ist view and the critical multiculturalist view raise two 
problems that might undermine the viability and sustain-
ability of a polity and risk violating the rights of some 
of its citizens despite their intended positive integrative 
function. First, conferring minority rights to ethnocul-
tural groups may put some members of these groups at 
risk vis-à-vis their own group and the broader society 
by making it considerably more difficult for them to en-
joy their individual civil and political rights. Contrary to 
the assumption shared by the moderate multicultural-
ist view and different sub-variants of liberalism, such as 
those holding an autonomy-liberalism position, societal 
cultures are not internally homogeneous as they can be 
internally divided across different lines (religious, politi-
cal, socio-economic etc.). External protections against 
the influence of majority culture may have the effect of 
coercively diminishing or reducing the options available 
within a particular minority group therefore restricting 
its members to the options available as well as reducing 
the overall diversity within a society. The liberal egali-
tarian critique argues that the introduction of minority 
rights might leave members of these cultural groups un-
educated or otherwise disadvantaged and with fewer 
opportunities to compete in the wider society. Second, 
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whereas civil and political rights are status-based, with 
those holding the status of citizenship being entitled 
to them, cultural rights granted to some non-dominant 
minority groups fail to comply with the commitment of 
civic equality and the principle of non-discrimination 
since only those cultural groups who are internally lib-
eral and democratic would be granted cultural rights. 
While this certainly avoids the problem of possible in-
group discrimination and oppression of at-risk members 
of these communities, the selective nature of cultural 
rights is both inegalitarian and discriminatory and there-
fore inconsistent with the principled commitment to 
civic equality. 
The other source of dispute between the liberal egal-
itarian and the multiculturalist scholars revolves around 
the nature of cultural membership and of culture itself 
(Song, 2007 [ch. 2]). Two distinct and divergent objec-
tions can be identified here. On the one hand, liberal 
egalitarian scholars advocate the uniform treatment ap-
proach (Barry, 2001) towards cultural diversity. Its main 
contention is that – from a liberal egalitarian perspective 
– minority rights and the associated model of multicul-
tural or differentiated citizenship are not a requirement 
of justice. On the other hand, advocates of either the 
moderate multiculturalist view or the critical multicul-
turalist view argue succinctly that ethnocultural mem-
bership and minority status is part of one’s circumstance 
and is therefore entitled to justice-based entitlements 
such as minority rights or exemptions from otherwise 
binding norms and laws. 
The feminist critique
The feminist critique of multicultural policies (e.g. 
Enslin, 2003; Okin, 1998; Nussbaum, 1999; Shachar, 
2001) is directed against the two views of the multicul-
tural critique of the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship. According to this critique, 
minority rights discriminate against the least well-off 
members of those minority groups who are the benefi-
ciaries of a differentiated allocation of rights. Minority 
rights risk creating in-group discrimination while aiming 
to reduce between-group discrimination or inequality. In 
this interpretation, the feminist critique of multicultural-
ism advances the objection that group-rights will create 
the “paradox of multicultural vulnerability” (Shachar, 
2001), i.e. the creation of within-group inequalities as 
an effect of group-differentiated rights. It points to the 
unequal distribution of the benefits of minority rights 
within a particular community as well as the discrimina-
tion against members of a particular disadvantaged or 
marginalized community who are most at risk (usually 
women and children). This assertion implies that mul-
ticultural policies have a twofold effect, i.e. the direct 
effect and the indirect effect. The direct effect of a group-
differentiated policy or remedy is to reduce the inequal-
ity between groups and contribute to a more egalitarian 
and stable society. On the other hand, the indirect effect 
of a group-differentiated policy consists in the assertion 
that this policy would contribute to more inegalitarian 
relationships within the beneficiary community and that 
most at-risk members of these groups will be consider-
ably worse-off. While the multicultural claims were ad-
vanced under a broadly liberal claim for increasing the 
self-respect of minority ethnocultural groups and other 
social groups, the feminist rejection of multicultural-
ism rests on the assertion that multicultural policies are 
likely to create more harm than good, i.e. that its ef-
fects [either intended or unintended] will outweigh the 
intended positive effects multiculturalism is likely to ex-
pect. The feminist criticism of multiculturalism argues 
that the value of gender equality is an important limit 
on cultural accommodation which challenges both the 
justice-based claims of minority groups as well as the 
integrative function of the claims for accommodation.
The paradox of multicultural diversity
I want to join the critics of multicultural [group-dif-
ferentiated] policies and the two models of group-dif-
ferentiated citizenship for a different but related set of 
arguments. What I find objectionable in the multicul-
tural project in general is the negative side effect of an 
intended positive policy, which is the recognition and 
accommodation of diversity in the basic institutional 
framework of a plurally diverse polity. I argue that the 
multiculturalist objection against the liberal version of 
the rights-based conception of citizenship and its com-
mitment to civic equality creates two important prob-
lems. The first problem refers to the possible violation of 
the individual rights of women and other at-risk mem-
bers of those minority groups who can claim vulnerabil-
ity via the system of differentiated citizenship and has 
been identified as ‘the paradox of multicultural vulner-
ability’. This problem is related to the tension between 
common principles and shared public values of a par-
ticular political community and those values that con-
stitute the ethical environment of a particular cultural 
group (Haydon, 2006a).
In contrast, the second problem, I maintain, can po-
tentially reduce the overall diversity within a political 
community as well as jeopardise the individual freedom 
of some of the individuals who are members of minority 
groups. Like languages, cultures and practices are di-
verse and plural in nature as well. By publicly recognis-
ing and accommodating a particular minority culture or 
some of its aspects we risk failing to acknowledge the 
internal diversity, pluralism and heterogeneity of a par-
ticular minority culture and its ethical environment. As 
Jeff Spinner-Halev emphasises, “[i]nclusiveness does not 
reinforce distinctiveness, as some multiculturalists seem 
to think; inclusiveness wears away differences” (Spin-
ner-Halev, 1994, 180). At the same time, a particular 
multicultural policy could essentialise a particular form 
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of cultural diversity it aims to protect or accommodate. 
This creates the paradox of multicultural diversity. At the 
same time, in particular cases group-differentiated rights 
might violate the basic civil and political rights of the 
most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of a mi-
nority group [the reverse spillover effect]. This criticism 
is premised on the assumption that the basic problem 
of group-differentiated rights is that members of a par-
ticular group do not share equally a particular disadvan-
tage. We can therefore conclude that group-differenti-
ated rights as a compensatory and integrative strategy 
or policy to reduce the inequalities and disadvantages 
between groups cannot function as an equalisandum 
within a disadvantaged community as its members do 
not share equally a particular disadvantage. The basic 
problem of any claim for group-specific accommoda-
tion of diversity, I maintain, rests on the assumption that 
members of a particular group bear an equal share of a 
particular disadvantage. I call this the fallacy of equal 
disadvantage. This paradox together with the paradox 
of multicultural vulnerability explicated above points 
to a number of potential perverse side effects of both 
the theory and the policy of multiculturalism and its in-
consistency with the liberal version of the rights-based 
conception of citizenship and its commitment to civic 
equality.
CONCLUSION
As I have argued in this article, the difficulty in con-
ceptualizing citizenship as a political conception of the 
person, originates from its complexity and controver-
siality as any of its existing conceptions entail several 
distinct and interrelated meanings, i.e. sharing a com-
mon legal status of civic equality, enjoying the benefits 
of a formally defined set of basic rights and fundamental 
liberties and assuming the responsibilities that give ef-
fect to the experience of shared membership in a politi-
cal community. While both the expansion of member-
ship and the expansion of entitlement associated with 
the liberal version of the rights-based conception of 
citizenship have resulted in a more just and inclusive 
polity and in an egalitarian status of citizenship, its crit-
ics forcefully argue that this conception of citizenship is 
either too permissive and inefficient on the one hand or 
too divisive, unfairly discriminatory and oppressive on 
the other. While both of these criticisms and the related 
objections against the integrative and the redistributive 
character of our commitment to civic equality rightly di-
agnose the foundational tension any conception of citi-
zenship in a plurally diverse polity is faced with, both 
projects explicated above fail to grasp the complexity of 
the problem at hand. I maintain that neither traditional 
nor contemporary critics of the liberal version of the 
rights-based conception of citizenship in offering a con-
ception of civic equality that would be consistent with 
the fair terms of engagement with diversity. The differ-
ence between various conceptions of citizenship then, 
is not just a matter of the distribution of entitlements as-
sociated with a conception of citizenship as a political 
conception of the person. 
In fact, any conception of citizenship that claim to 
be consistent with the liberal ideal of free and equal citi-
zenship is therefore left with two major challenges that 
it needs to take into account: firstly, to see whether it can 
pay equal civic respect to all citizens in the design of its 
basic institutional framework [the requirement of equal 
civic respect]; and secondly, to see whether equality of 
respect and concern including recognition and accom-
modation of diversity will increase social harmony, in-
clusion and a sense of unity among members of a polity 
[the problem of social unity and stability]. These issues 
leave us with two fundamental questions which need to 
be answered. First, what kind of priority do basic rights 
and fundamental freedoms together with shared public 
values and basic democratic values require, since re-
spect for diversity and, more particularly, acknowledg-
ing the limited claims of liberal public reason, call for 
certain kinds of restraint with respect to our public agen-
da? Second, how are accommodation and recognition 
of diversity in the institutional framework of a plurally 
diverse polity able to be consistent with our twofold 
normative commitment to civic equality and equal civic 
respect for diversity? The difficulties, problems and chal-
lenges identified above require an articulation of a con-
ception of difference-sensitivity that would reconcile the 
requirement of civic equality with the acceptance and 
respect of diversity.
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POVZETEK
Težava pri konceptualizaciji državljanstva kot političnega koncepta posameznika izvira iz kompleksnosti pojma, 
saj vsaka od obstoječih definicij obsega več različnih in medsebojno povezanih pomenov. Iz obsežne obstoječe lite-
rature s področja temeljev, narave in vrednote državljanstva v pluralni raznoliki ureditvi je razvidno, da so nekateri 
izmed najpomembnejših vidikov, povezanih z državljanstvom kot osebnim političnim konceptom, še vedno predmet 
debate in je tako vsak koncept državljanstva podvržen različnim interpretacijam. Izraženi so bili številni pomisleki o 
konceptu državljanstva, utemeljenem na pravicah, in trditve, da je taka koncepcija preveč permisivna in neučinkovi-
ta ali preveč razdvajajoča, nepravično diskriminatorna in zatiralska. Prispevek analizira temelje, naravo in vrednoto 
normativne zaveze državljanski enakosti, povezane s konceptom državljanstva, utemeljenem na pravicah. Sestavljen 
je iz petih delov. Prvi del se prične z razlago na pravicah utemeljenega koncepta državljanstva kot deljenega po-
litičnega statusa, povezanega s svobodno in enakopravno pripadnostjo politični skupnosti. Nato določim temeljne 
razsežnosti državljanstva in raziščem osnovne elemente državljanstva, utemeljenega na pravicah. V drugem delu 
se osredotočam na številne pomisleke o liberalni različici koncepta državljanstva, utemeljenega na pravicah. Nada-
ljujem s predstavitvijo tradicionalne in sodobne kritike koncepta državljanstva, utemeljenega na pravicah. Posebej 
pozorno kritično ocenim oba modela multikulturnega državljanstva. Nato v tretjem delu sledi pregled več različnih 
kritik multikulturalizma in njegovih modelov diferenciranega državljanstva. Na tem mestu opredelim razne parado-
kse, ki se porajajo iz multikulturnega razumevanja državljanske enakosti, tudi paradoks multikulturne raznolikosti, ki 
kaže na v veliki meri neraziskane učinke politike multikulturalizma. V sklepnem delu prispevka orišem potrebo po 
razliki-občutljivosti, ki je skladna z liberalno različico na pravicah utemeljenega koncepta državljanstva in njegovo 
zavezanostjo državljanski enakosti.
Ključne besede: državljanstvo, državljanska enakost, liberalizem, multikulturalizem, raznolikost, pluralizem
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